THE DRED SCOTT CASE
APRIL TERM, 1854
Dred Scott, Plaintiff in error, v. John F. A.
Sandford.
Dred Scott sued his owner,
John F. A. Sanford on three counts of assault. One count against
Dred Scott, one against his wife, and one against his children.
The merits of the suit against
Mr. Sanford rested on the premise that because of the Missouri
Compromise, Dred Scott became a free man when he was brought
into the state of Illinois, thus his "owner" had no
right to assault him in that he was a free man and citizen.
But, the Court declared the
Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional because it deprived
a person of his or her property; a slave, without due process of
law. The court also ruled that slaves were not citizens of any
state nor of the United States.
What follows is the pleadings
from the original case as well as the court opinion as written
by Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney [See photo and bio
below].
Dred Scott, Plaintiff in error, v. John F. A.
Sandford.
Supreme Court of the United
States 60 U.S. 393; 15 L. Ed. 691
December, 1856 Term
It was an action of trespass
vi et armis instituted in the Circuit Court by Scott against
Sandford. Prior to the institution of the present suit, an
action was brought by Scott for his freedom in the Circuit Court
of St. Louis county, (State court,) where there was a verdict
and judgment in his favor. On a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the State, the judgment below was reversed, and the
case remanded to the Circuit Court, where it was continued to
await the decision of the case now in question.
The declaration of Scott
contained three counts: one, that Sandford had assaulted the
plaintiff; one, that he had assaulted Harriet Scott, his wife;
and one, that he had assaulted Eliza Scott and Lizzie Scott, his
children.
Sandford appeared, and filed
the following plea:
DRED SCOTT v. JOHN
F. A. SANDFORD.
Plea to the Jurisdiction of
the Court.
APRIL TERM, 1854.
And the said John F. A.
Sandford, in his own proper person, comes and says that this
court ought not to have or take further cognizance of the action
aforesaid, because he says that said cause of action, and each
and every one of them, (if any such have accrued to the said
Dred Scott,) accrued to the said Dred Scott out of the
jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri, for that,
to wit: the said plaintiff, Dred Scott, is not a citizen of
the State of Missouri [Ed's italics], as alleged in his
declaration, because he is a negro of African descent; his
ancestors were of pure African blood [Ed.'s italics], and
were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves, and
this the said Sandford is ready to verify. Wherefore, he prays
judgment whether this court can or will take further cognizance
of the action aforesaid.
JOHN F. A. SANDFORD.
To this plea there was a
demurrer in the usual form, which was argued in April, 1854,
when the court gave judgment that the demurrer should be
sustained.
In May, 1854, the defendant,
in pursuance of an agreement between counsel, and with the leave
of the court, pleaded in bar of the action:
Not guilty.
That the plaintiff was a negro
slave, the lawful property of the defendant, and, as such, the
defendant gently laid his hands upon him, and thereby had only
restrained him, as the defendant had a right to do.
That with respect to the wife
and daughters of the plaintiff, in the second and third counts
of the declaration mentioned, the defendant had, as to them,
only acted in the same manner, and in virtue of the same legal
right.
In the first of these pleas,
the plaintiff joined issue; and to the second and third filed
replications alleging that the defendant, of his own wrong and
without the cause in his second and third pleas alleged,
committed the trespasses.
The counsel then filed the
following agreed statement of facts, viz:
In the year 1834, the
plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a
surgeon in the army of the United States. In that year, 1834,
said Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri
to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois,
and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May,
1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the
plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military
post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the
Mississippi river, in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana,
acquired by the United States of France, and situate north of
the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and
north of the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the
plaintiff in a slavery at said Fort Snelling, from said
last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who
is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was
the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of
the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro
took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post,
situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave
until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave
at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore
named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said
Fort Snelling until the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the
plaintiff and said Harriet at said Fort Snelling, with the
consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master
and owner, intermarried, and took each other for husband
and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of
the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage
[Ed.'s italics]. Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born
on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of the north line of the
State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is
about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at
the military post called Jefferson Barracks.
In the year 1838, said Dr.
Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said
daughter Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the State of
Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of
this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff,
said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves,
and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each
of them as slaves. At the times mentioned in the Plaintiff's
declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid
his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and
imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more
than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves
at such times [Ed.'s italics].
Further proof may be given on
the trial for either party.
It is agreed that Dred Scott
brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
county; that there was a verdict and judgment in his favor; that
on a writ of error to the Supreme Court, the judgment below was
reversed, and the same remanded to the Circuit Court, where it
has been continued to await the decision of this case.
In May, 1854, the cause went
before a jury, who found the following verdict, viz: "As to
the first issue joined in this case, we of the jury find the
defendant not guilty; and as to the issue secondly above joined,
we of the jury find that before and at the time when, &c.,
in the first count mentioned, the said Dred Scott was a negro
slave, the lawful property of the defendant; and as to the issue
thirdly above joined, we, the jury, find that before and at the
time when, &c., in the second and third counts mentioned,
the said Harriet, wife of said Dred Scott, and Eliza and Lizzie,
the daughters of the said Dred Scott, were negro slaves, the
lawful property of the defendant."
Whereupon, the court gave
judgment for the defendant. After an ineffectual motion for a
new trial, the plaintiff filed the following bill of exceptions.
On the trial of this cause by
the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part,
read to the jury the following agreed statement of facts, (see
agreement above.) No further testimony was given to the jury by
either party. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to give to
the jury the following instruction, viz:
"That, upon the facts
agreed to by the parties, they ought to find for the plaintiff.
The court refused to give such instruction to the jury, and the
plaintiff, to such refusal, then and there duly excepted."
The court then gave the
following instruction to the jury, on motion of the defendant:
"The jury are instructed,
that upon the facts in this case, the law is with the
defendant." The plaintiff excepted to this instruction.
Upon these exceptions, the
case came up to this court.
It was argued at December
term, 1855, and ordered to be reargued at the present term.
The Verdict
The verdict was that Scott, or
any slave, was not free by virtue of residence in a free state
or territory, and since Scott was living in Missouri, his status
must ultimately be determined in a court there. The verdict also
stated that Negroes were not "citizens" as stated in
the Constitution, and did not have the right to sue in any
federal court. When it was decided that the Missouri Compromise
was unconstitutional, it was on the grounds that slaves were
property, and prohibiting slavery in free territories would
violate a slave owner's right to own property.
The Opinion
The question is simply this:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and
sold as slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the constitution of these
United States and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the
citizen? . . .
The words "people of the
United States" and "citizens" are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe political
body who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call
the "sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The
question before us is, whether the class of persons described in
the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are
constituent members of this sovereignty?
We think they are not, and
that they are not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word "citizens" in the
constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at
that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges..................
It is not the province of the
court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or
impolicy, of these laws. The decision Of that question belonged
to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the
sovereignty and framed the constitution. The duty of the court
is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best
lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we
find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was
adopted
In discussing this question,
we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may
confer within its own limits, and and the rights of citizenship
as member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because
he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State,
that he must be a citizen of. the United States. He may have all
of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet
not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any
other State.
For, previous to the option of
the Constitution of the United States, every State had the
undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character
of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this
character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State,
and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond
those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of
States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of
conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the
Constitution of United States...
It is very clear, therefore,
that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since
the adoption of the constitution, introduce a new member into
the political community created by the constitution of the
United States. It cannot make him a member of this community by
making him a member of its own. And for the same reason it
cannot introduce any person, or description of persons, who were
not intended to be embraced in this new political family, which
the constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be
excluded from it.
The question then arises,
whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the
personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State
should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that
time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who
had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to
put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of
the United States, and endue him with the full rights of
citizenship in every other State without consent? Does the
constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall
be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the
rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own
courts?
The court thinks the
affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if
it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the
State of Missouri, within the meaning of the constitution of the
United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its
courts.
It is true, every person, and
every class and description of persons, who were at the time of
the adoption of the constitution recognized as citizens in the
several States, became also citizens of this new political
body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and
their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights
and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty
were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the
several State communities, or who should afterwards by
birthright or otherwise become members, according to the
provisions of the constitution and the principles on which it
was founded.
In the opinion of the court
the legislation and histories of the times, and the language
used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the
class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be
included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.
The government of the United
States had no right to interfere for any other purpose but that
protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with
the several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated
or not, as each State may think justice, humanity, and the
interests and safety of society, require...
The act of Congress, upon
which the plaintiff relies, declares that slavery and
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall
be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by
France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude and not
included within the limits of Missouri.
And the difficulty which meets
us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry is whether
Congress was authorized to pass this law under any of the powers
granted to it by the Constitution; for, if the authority is not
given by that instrument, it is the duty of this Court to
declare it void and inoperative and incapable of conferring
freedom upon anyone who is held as a slave under the laws of any
one of the states...
We do not mean . . . to
question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to
expand the territory of the United States by the admission of
new states is plainly given; and in the construction of this
power by all the departments of the government, it has been held
to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission
at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and
situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to
become a state and not to be held as a colony and governed by
Congress with absolute Authority; and, as the propriety of
admitting a new state is committed to the sound discretion of
Congress, the power to acquire territory for that purpose, to be
held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition to
become a state upon an equal footing with the other states, must
rest upon the same discretional.
But the power of Congress over
the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere
discretionary power under our Constitution and form of
government. The powers of the government and the rights and
privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by
the Constitution itself.
These powers, and others, in
relation to rights of person, which it is not necessary here to
enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the
general government; and the rights of private property have been
guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united
with the rights of person and placed on the same ground by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a
citizen of the United States of his liberty of property, without
due process of law, merely because he came himself or brought
his property into a particular territory of the United States,
and who had committed no offense against the law, could hardly
be dignified with the name of due process of law.
It seems, however, to be
supposed that there is a difference between property in a slave
and other property and that different rules may be applied to it
in expounding Constitution of the United States. And the laws
and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon
the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and
duties, and the powers which governments may exercise over it,
have been dwelt upon in the argument.
But, in considering the
question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no
law of nations standing between the people of the United States
and their government and interfering with their relation to each
other. The powers of the government and the rights of the
citizen under it are positive and practical regulations plainly
written down. The people of the United States have delegated to
it certain enumerated powers and forbidden it to exercise
others. It has no power over the person of property of a citizen
but what the citizens of the United States have granted. And no
laws or usages of other nations, or reasoning of statesmen of
jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can enlarge the
powers of the government or take from the citizens the rights
they have reserved.
And if the Constitution
recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and
makes no distinction between that description of property and
other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the
authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction
or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guaranties which
have been provided for the protection of private property
against the encroachments of the government.
Now, as we have already said
in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like
an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed
to the citizens of the United States, in every state that might
desire it, for twenty years. And the government in express terms
is pledged to protect it in all future time if the slave escapes
from his owner.
That is done in plain
words--too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found
in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over
slave property or which entitles property of that kind to less
protection than property of any other description. The only
power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding
and protecting the owner in his rights.
Upon these considerations it
is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which
prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this
kind in the territory of the United States north of the line
therein mentioned is not warranted by the Constitution and is
therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of
his family, were made free by being carried into this territory;
even if they had been carried there by the owner with the
intention of becoming a permanent resident.
*
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 |
Taney, Roger Brooke , 1777–1864,
American jurist, fifth Chief Justice of the United States (1836–64),
b. Calvert Co., Md., grad. Dickinson College, 1795.
Taney's support of the slavery laws was most clearly expressed in the
Dred Scoot Case (1857). Here he held that slaves (and even the free
descendants of slaves) were not citizens and might not sue in the
federal courts, and that Congress could not forbid slavery in the
territories of the United States. Opposition to the second holding was
furiously expressed by the Republicans, and when Lincoln became
President he considered Taney an arch foe. In the Civil War, Taney in
vain ruled against Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
(see Merryman, ex parte). There was much antipathy to Taney at his
death, but there has been a gradual increase in appreciation of his
contributions to constitutional law. |
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|
The Fiery Trial
Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery
By Eric Foner
A mixture of
visionary progressivism and repugnant racism,
Abraham Lincoln's attitude toward slavery is the
most troubling aspect of his public life, one that
gets a probing assessment in this study. Columbia
historian and Bancroft Prize winner Foner (Free
Soil, Free Labor, Free Men) traces the
complexities of Lincoln's evolving ideas about
slavery and African-Americans: while he detested
slavery, he also publicly rejected political and
social equality for blacks, dragged his feet
(critics charged) on emancipating slaves and
accepting black recruits into the Union army, and
floated schemes for colonizing freedmen overseas
almost to war's end. Foner situates this record
within a lucid, nuanced discussion of the era's
turbulent racial politics; in his account Lincoln is
a canny operator, cautiously navigating the racist
attitudes of Northern whites, prodded--and sometimes
willing to be prodded--by abolitionists and racial
egalitarians pressing faster reforms. But as Foner
tells it, Lincoln also embodies a society-wide
transformation in consciousness, as the war's
upheavals and the dynamic new roles played by
African-Americans made previously unthinkable claims
of freedom and equality seem inevitable. Lincoln is
no paragon in Foner's searching portrait, but
something more essential--a politician with an open
mind and a restless conscience. 16 pages of illus.,
3 maps.—Publishers
Weekly |
 |
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 |
Sources:
Chapter VI. "The Instruction of Negroes." In Edgar W.
Knight..
A Documentary History of Education in the South before 1860. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1953
Chapter 10 "Up From Slavery: Educational and
other Rights of Negroes." In Edgar W. Knight and Clifton L. Hall. Readings
in American Educational History. New York Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951. Many states had laws prohibiting
the education of blacks; here black youngsters are turned away at the
school door |
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|
Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in
America
By Melissa V.
Harris-Perry
According to the
author, this society has historically exerted
considerable pressure on black females to fit into one
of a handful of stereotypes, primarily, the Mammy, the
Matriarch or the Jezebel. The selfless
Mammy’s behavior is marked by a slavish devotion to
white folks’ domestic concerns, often at the expense of
those of her own family’s needs. By contrast, the
relatively-hedonistic Jezebel is a sexually-insatiable
temptress. And the Matriarch is generally thought of as
an emasculating figure who denigrates black men, ala the
characters Sapphire and Aunt Esther on the television
shows Amos and Andy and Sanford and Son, respectively.
Professor Perry
points out how the propagation of these harmful myths
have served the mainstream culture well. For instance,
the Mammy suggests that it is almost second nature for
black females to feel a maternal instinct towards
Caucasian babies.
As for the source
of the Jezebel, black women had no control over their
own bodies during slavery given that they were being
auctioned off and bred to maximize profits. Nonetheless,
it was in the interest of plantation owners to propagate
the lie that sisters were sluts inclined to mate
indiscriminately.
|
 |
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The White Masters of the
World
From
The World and Africa, 1965
By W. E. B. Du Bois
W. E. B. Du Bois’
Arraignment and Indictment of White Civilization
(Fletcher)
* *
* * *
Ancient African Nations
* * * * *
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Only a Pawn in Their Game
Rev. Jesse Lee Peterson Thanks America for
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George Jackson /
Hurricane Carter
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The Journal of Negro History issues at Project Gutenberg
The
Haitian Declaration of Independence 1804
/
January 1, 1804 -- The Founding of
Haiti
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update 22 July 2008
