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The Impact of Katrina Race and Class
in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods
By John R. Logan
Early media reports about the wind damage and
flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina focused on New Orleans, and
especially on the people who had been unable to escape the city
before it flooded. Images of poor and predominantly black people
crowded into the Superdome and Convention Center supported the
impression that Katrina had disproportionately affected poor,
black neighborhoods. The purpose of this report is to evaluate
more precisely what neighborhoods were heavily damaged,
including not only New Orleans but also the coastal communities
in Mississippi that bore the brunt of hurricane-force winds.
In brief an analysis of FEMA storm damage
data shows that the storm’s impact was disproportionately
borne by the region’s African American community, by people
who rented their homes, and by the poor and unemployed.
1. More than a third of the region’s
1.7 million residents lived in areas that suffered flooding or
moderate to catastrophic storm damage, according to FEMA. The
majority of people living in damaged areas were in the City of
New Orleans (over 350,000), with additional concentrations in
suburban Jefferson Parish (175,000) and St. Bernard Parish
(53,000) and along the Mississippi Coast (54,000).
2. In the region as a whole, the
disparities in storm damage are shown in the following
comparisons (arranged in order of the degree of disparity):
• By race. Damaged areas were 45.8% black,
compared to 26.4% in undamaged areas.
• By housing tenure. 45.7% of homes in
damaged areas were occupied by renters, compared to 30.9% in
undamaged communities.
• By poverty and employment status. 20.9%
of households had incomes below the poverty line in damaged
areas, compared to 15.3% in undamaged areas. 7.6% of persons in
the labor force were unemployed in damaged areas (before the
storm), compared to 6.0% in undamaged areas.
3. These comparisons are heavily
influenced by the experience of the City of New Orleans. Outside
the city, there were actually smaller shares of African
American, poor, and unemployed residents in the damaged areas.
4. Closer inspection of neighborhoods
within New Orleans shows that some affluent white neighborhoods
were hard hit, while some poor minority neighborhoods were
spared. Yet if the post-Katrina city were limited to the
population previously living in areas that were undamaged by the
storm – that is, if nobody were able to return to damaged
neighborhoods – New Orleans is at risk of losing more than 80%
of its black population. This means that policy choices
affecting who can return, to which neighborhoods, and with what
forms of public and private assistance, will greatly affect the
future character of the city.
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A similar analysis has been completed by the
Congressional Research Service (available at http://www.gnocdc.org/reports/crsrept.pdf).
This report reaches similar conclusions regarding the region as
a whole, but provides more detailed information about variations
among neighborhoods in the City of New Orleans, where the
majority of affected persons lived. To supplement this report,
Brown University’s American Communities Project has developed
a web-based map system that includes all of the information
analyzed here.
The site is http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/index.html
. It identifies the broad zones of the three-state region where
FEMA was authorized to provide assistance. It also shows the
more specific areas classified as flooded or moderately to
catastrophically storm-damaged by FEMA.
At a detailed zoom level, the user can
display aerial photographs from early September 2001 that have
been made available by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) at http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/katrina.
The web system also displays a wide variety of population
characteristics from Census 2000 for census tracts. Within the
City of New Orleans, it is also possible to see how census
tracts are grouped into neighborhoods by the city for planning
Some largely white neighborhoods of affluent
homeowners were completely flooded, while some relatively poor
black neighborhoods were spared. However there is a general
tendency as shown in Table 2 for blacks and poor residents to
have greater odds of being in harm’s way.
Discussions of the racially differential
impact of Katrina have often emphasized the Lower Ninth Ward
(where many homes were entirely demolished by the breach in the
levee of the Industrial Canal) and New Orleans East. Most
neighborhoods in these planning districts were more than 85%
black, and most residences were damaged. A majority of
residents of both of these planning districts were homeowners,
though there were clear class distinctions between the two areas.
More than a third of Lower Ninth Ward residents were below the
poverty line, and nearly 14% were unemployed. New Orleans
East had a considerably larger middle class component, though it
was not among the city’s most affluent sections.
Many of the most segregated neighborhoods
with the highest poverty rates are those identified as “projects,”
a reference to the prominence of public housing within their
borders. The project neighborhoods typically had poverty rates
in the range of 60-80% of the population, unemployment is
above 20%, they were all predominantly black (with African
Americans accounting for 90% or more of their residents), and
80% or more of residents were renters.
There are six such neighborhoods in New
Orleans (though there are concentrations of public housing or
Section 8 housing in other parts of the city). In five of them
with a combined 2000 population of over 15,000 persons (Calliope,
Iberville, St. Bernard Area, Desire, and Florida) the entire
territory meets this report’s definition of damaged areas. The
Fischer Project neighborhood in Algiers was little
damaged. (A seventh project neighborhood, the St. Thomas
Project in the Central City/Garden District, was demolished
in 2002, replaced by a Wal-Mart and new predominantly
market-rate condominiums. . . .
At the other end of the class spectrum are a
number of more advantaged neighborhoods with poverty rates below
10% or unemployment rates below 5%. In the most heavily impacted
planning districts, few neighborhoods meet either criterion.
These include the Lake-Terrace/Lake Oaks neighborhood in
Gentilly and the Read Boulevard East neighborhood in New
Orleans East. Most such neighborhoods are in the Lakeview
Planning District, which is an area with a small black
population, mostly homeowners, and very low rates of poverty and
unemployment. Here only the Lakeshore/Lake Vista neighborhood,
adjacent to Lake Pontchartrain, was partly spared.
Few residents in the French Quarter, a
predominantly white neighborhood with a poverty rate of
about 11% and unemployment below 5%, lived in tracts that were
flooded. Among other neighborhoods with a national reputation
for affluence, the Garden District neighborhood was not
flooded and only 40% of the Audubon/University
neighborhood (home of Tulane University and Loyola University)
was damaged.
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Policy implications
The sheer number of people who lived in
heavily damaged areas – over 640,000 – is a reminder of the
scale of Katrina’s impact. Because the storm hit large numbers
of people of every race and class, it seems likely that public
support for policies to assist these people will also cut across
race and class lines. However there was also a substantial
disproportionate impact on African Americans and people with
fewer resources.
These disparities stem from within the City
of New Orleans itself, and more specifically from vulnerability
to flooding. This is a pattern with deep roots, and although
Katrina caused the most extensive flooding in memory, prior
studies by historians (such as An Unnatural Metropolis by
Craig Colten) have demonstrated that both high ground and public
investments in drainage and pumping systems consistently worked
to the advantage of certain neighborhoods in past storms.
There are major variations across the region
that are likely to affect the process of recovery. Damage was
extensive on the Mississippi Coast, and the area’s largest
single source of employment – casino gambling – was knocked
out of operation. In comparison to New Orleans, however, the
number of people living in areas of moderate or greater damage
was small, only about 50,000. And also in contrast to New
Orleans, only a small share of these people were black and a
majority were homeowners.
It is difficult to assess the importance of
race in recovery policy in Mississippi, but in a politically
conservative state it could make a big difference that white
homeowners constitute the bulk of claimants for state
assistance. Further, these people are easier to serve for
several reasons.
1. First, they are identifiable and –
because they retain an ownership interest in their properties
– they should prove easier for authorities to contact.
2. Second, since much of the damage wrought
by Katrina in this area was by wind and rain damage, standard
homeowner policies offer substantial private sector coverage of
damage losses. For those with uninsured flood damage, the state
government currently expects federal aid to be sufficient to
fund payments of $150,000 to individual homeowners.
3. Third, the low density of housing in this
area means that typically even when one’s home was
uninhabitable, there was space for a trailer in the driveway.
Since in addition the loss of electrical power was relatively
short-term in Mississippi, and basic public services could be
restored within a reasonable time, homeowners in this region
more readily met the requirements for a FEMA-provided trailer
– space and confirmed utility hookups.
In contrast, consider the situation in New
Orleans. More than half the persons in damaged areas were
renters, unlikely to be protected in any way by property
insurance, and 30% fell below the poverty line and were
therefore unlikely to have personal resources to return to the
city. By the end of 2005, power was still unavailable much
of the city, and actual connections to electric power required
residents to present evidence of inspection by a licensed
electrician before power would be restored to an individual
home. The utility company (a subsidiary of the Entergy
Corporation) had filed for bankruptcy protection in September.
People who previously lived in public
housing seem to have the least chances to return, given
current policy. All public housing in the affected areas has
been closed (and special barriers bolted to the doors), and
residents have been allotted rental housing assistance in areas
where they have relocated for up to 18 months. Plans for
reopening the projects or for constructing new affordable
housing have not become public.
For many of the same reasons that rebuilding
will be facilitated on the Mississippi Coast, the white
residents of the City of New Orleans are more likely than black
residents to be able to return to their neighborhoods, even
if the neighborhood is reopened. Whites are more likely to be
homeowners (55% compared to 42% among African American
households), but more important, they are much more likely to
have the personal resources to reinvest in their homes or to
find a new residence in a difficult housing market.
In the pre-Katrina black population, 35% were
below the poverty line and the median household income was only
$25,000. Among whites, only 11% were poor and the median income
was more than twice as high – $61,000.
Therefore even among homeowners, blacks are
less likely to have the means to rebuild than are whites. There
is potential for political coalitions that cut across the racial
and class divisions that have helped structure city politics
over the decades.
Residents of such very different
neighborhoods as Lakeview and the Lower Ninth Ward have a shared
interest in short-term assistance programs such as subsidies for
temporary housing outside the city. Up to now few city
residents have qualified for FEMA trailers outside their homes
because they do not own the home, or there is insufficient space
for a trailer, or public utilities remain unavailable.
As long as issues can be framed so that
demands are oriented toward FEMA (an external target) or toward
demands for services like electricity or schools or police
protection that affect all segments of the public, the
appearance of unity can be maintained. The City Council’s
repeated stands in favor of rebuilding all parts of the city –
a question on which the Council is unlikely to have the final
word – is a reflection of this temporary unity.
Yet variations across neighborhoods – and
across race and class – are likely to support the emergence of
a sense of conflicting interests. In December 2005 conflict took
the form of opposition to proposals to locate FEMA trailers in
public spaces within neighborhoods that sustained less damage.
In this case the interests of advantaged neighborhoods
(advantaged by protection from flooding and by having residents
in place to express their views) were in conflict with the
interests of absent residents who have no place to return. Not
surprisingly the City Council gave its members veto power over
new trailer parks in the areas that they represent.
In the longer term there is likely to be
competition between damaged neighborhoods for the supports that
will be necessary for rebuilding. In mid-January 2006, the Bring
New Orleans Back Commission (a policy group formed by city
government) released a planning report that began to address
this question. The Commission identified some parts of the city
as “immediate opportunity areas.”
[I]t is clear that the Commission proposes
rebuilding in some areas that were flooded. They include areas
along the river near the central business district, Holy Cross
in the Lower Ninth Ward Planning District, and Lakewood/West End
and Lakeshore/Lake Vista bordering Lake Pontchartrain. Generally
these are zones where sustained flooding was under about four
feet.
The Commission also recommended the
designation of large portions of the city as “neighborhood
planning” areas. Within these areas the Commission recommends
a temporary halt on issuance of building permits. Only where
there is evidence within the next four months that residents are
committed to returning to each neighborhood in large numbers
would rebuilding be approved.
The precise criteria underlying these
designations have not been announced, and the Commission’s
recommendations have not been formally adopted. This is a
temporary solution to the political problem that few public
officials are willing to state openly that some areas will
not be permitted to be resettled. On its face it leaves the
decision to local residents. Clearly some areas are at risk of
being closed to reconstruction.
In January 2006, the full-time population of the
city has been estimated at only 150,000. The analysis in this
report suggests that if the future city were limited to the
population previously living in zones undamaged by Katrina it
would risk losing about 50% of its white residents but more than
80% of its black population. This is why the continuing question
about the hurricane is this: whose city will be rebuilt?
Source:
http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf
John R. Logan / Professor of Sociology,
Brown University / Director, Spatial Structures in the Social
Sciences / (401) 863-2267 / John_Logan@brown.edu
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Angry, but comin' home!
New Orleans, LA, The New Orleans Agenda, By
J. Brown -- A firsthand account by a Katrina Survival.
While I want desperately to return to New
Orleans, I am well aware of the shortage in housing. So, I went
into the FEMA Center which is located inside the Jewish
Community Center on St. Charles Avenue to discuss housing. Every
FEMA Center seems to be different and I get different answers at
each. I've gone to Shreveport and the Dallas, TX centers who
have given me nothing but misinformation. So, I decided to come
home to see about getting some clear answers since this is where
the catastrophe happened.
When I sat down in front of a young FEMA
worker, I asked her if there was some sort of
"voucher" program to assist with housing here in New
Orleans. I know vouchers where being given out in Houston and
Dallas, TX. I simply just wasn't a recipient of one. She
responded "No". In addition to her telling me
"no", she also said that FEMA had directed them (the
workers) to "Encourage us not to return to the city."
I was taken aback and thought just maybe she was young and
didn't know any better. So, I asked her to repeat her sentence
as I had a very puzzled look and she noticed it immediately. She
said, "We've been told to encourage people to relocate
outside of the state." My response to her was "You
mean temporarily?" and she said "No.
Permanently."
Still astonished, I said to her half crying
and angry "No, that can't be! How are we supposed to
rebuild if you're telling us to stay away!?" She then
looked to her right at her co-worker (who happened to be a black
man, she was white) and said to him "Isn't that
right?" He responded with a resounding "Yes!" She
then said to me, "Let me check your records. I see where
you've requested more rental assistance and it usually takes 2
to 4 weeks. But that's all the assistance you'll receive. After
that, you're on your own!"
This has only strengthened my resolve to
return to the N.O. But why are they telling people this and have
you heard of this from others and does other city officials know
about FEMA's practice to shun people away from returning. Tell
me who I need to share this information with as it clearly
defeats the purpose of rebuilding, repopulating an already
broken city. posted 28 January 2006
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update 7 July 2008 |
