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The Liberal Republicanism of Gordon Wood
By Steven
F. Hayward
26 January 2007
Gordon Wood is the favorite
historian of America's liberal establishment. His essays
appear regularly in the New York Review of Books and the
New Republic, and liberalism's leading
intellectuals—from
Michael Sandel to
Morton Horwitz to
Bruce Ackerman to
Cass Sunstein—regularly cite him with
approbation. What virtues do they see in his work? In
Wood's books, particularly his Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, they see a hammer with which to
bash American individualism and capitalism, and to
support an ever-growing administrative state.
Wood says that the American
Revolution was a "republican" revolution. By that he
means that it had intellectual roots ranging from
ancient Greece and Rome to the English Commonwealth, and
that it was more communal than capitalistic. "Ideally,"
he writes, "republicanism obliterated the individual."
He explains that
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republicanism was essentially
anti-capitalistic, a final attempt to come to terms with
the emergent individualistic society that threatened to
destroy once and for all the communion and benevolence
that civilized men had always considered to be the ideal
of human behavior. |
Given that belief, we should not be
surprised that America's liberals look to Wood to find
an image of America that suits them. In his
interpretation of the American Revolution, they find
support for their belief that what is good about the
American past is a certain
communitarianism, which they
wish to marry to the modern state. As
Mark Seidenfeld
wrote in the Harvard Law Review: "I view the civic
republican conception as providing an essential
justification for the modern bureaucratic state. . . .
Moreover, given the current ethic that approves of the
private pursuit of self-interest as a means of making
social policy, reliance on a more politically isolated
administrative state may be necessary to implement
something approaching the civic republican ideal."
Wood's work has been particularly
important to liberal legal theorists. They have embraced
key aspects of his argument in
Creation of the American
Republic as the foundation of a renewed attack on the
Constitution's few remaining restraints on government
power. Law reviews are packed with articles touting the
"revival of civic republicanism" as the new theoretical
justification for welfare-statism, and as a substantive
alternative to the historical dead-end of modern
individualism. Mindful of the defects of Marxism, legal
positivism, and Progressive era-style economic
regulation, and facing the need to overcome the
formidable arguments of constitutional originalism,
civic republicanism enables the Left to turn the tables
and claim an original intent argument of its own. The
Left's enthusiasm for Wood's ideas took off, not
coincidentally, in the late 1980s in the aftermath of
Attorney General Edwin Meese's elevation of the
controversy over original intent. As University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee historian J. David Hoeveler, Jr.,
observes,
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What is at stake is nothing less
than a contemporary liberal version of original intent.
. . . These reconstructions of republicanism apply with
varying specificity to the role of the Supreme Court in
American society. They constitute a liberal original
intent providing an ideological outline, or cultural
value system, that has direct applications to law and
the interpretation of law. |
Wood's Creation is invariably the
principal source offered as historical support.
The eager extrapolation of Wood's
argument is seen not merely among obscure,
tenure-seeking adventurists, but also among the leading
celebrities of the legal academy.
Horwitz, who teaches
at Harvard Law School, cites Wood to give effect to his
view that "republicanism was a truly coherent political
alternative to liberalism in American thought."
Sunstein, a leading light at the University of Chicago
Law School, is explicit about the project of finding a
non-Lockean, non-liberal narrative for America, writing
in the Yale Law Journal that
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it is no longer possible to see a
Lockean consensus in the founding period, or to treat
the framers as modern pluralists believing that
self-interest is the inevitable motivating force behind
political behavior. Republican thought played a central
role in the framing period, and it offers a powerful
conception of politics and of the functions of
constitutionalism. |
Sunstein adopts the postmodern
formula that property rights are a "social
construction," adding that "republicans are hardly
hostile to redistribution or to collective efforts to
reassess the existing distribution of wealth and
entitlements." And he is clear that civic republicanism,
as he understands it, involves the negation of natural
right: "What is distinctive about the republican view is
that it understands most rights as either preconditions
for or the outcome of an undistorted deliberative
process." In sum,
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[R]epublicans see the private
sphere as the product of public decisions, and deny the
existence of natural or prepolitical entitlements. . . .
The creation of such a sphere, based on a theory of
natural rights, coexists uneasily with republican
conceptions of politics. |
In
Sunstein's hands, civic
republicanism would entitle the judiciary—especially the
Supreme Court—to be more political than it already is,
and provide the theoretical basis for radical policy
prescriptions, such as a "New Deal for speech" in which
access to the media would be "redistributed" to make
American politics more "democratic."
Uncommon Liberal
Two questions come to mind: is this
a reasonable interpretation of Wood's work? And beyond
that, is Wood's interpretation of the American
Revolution itself reasonable?
It is not clear that Wood himself
would go as far as
Sunstein,
Seidenfeld, or the other
legal scholars who use his work as a prop. He is no
typical lefty academic, though he has taught American
history at Brown University for many years. He assails
postmodern multiculturalism in spirited terms:
"multiculturalism," he wrote in the William and Mary
Quarterly, "not only falsifies our past; it destroys our
future." He deplores relativism's "insidious" attack on
the idea of objectivity in historical research and
writing. He rejects the victimology inherent in the
class- and group-based obsession with
"oppression"—taking special aim at the prominent
oppression-studies specialist
Gary Nash (who criticized
Wood for not paying more attention to the Left's
anointed victim classifications). Wood comments: "What
is extraordinary about the American Revolution is not,
as Nash suggests, the continual deprivation and
repression of the mass of ordinary people but rather
their release and liberation."
In 1991, five years after Wood
wrote this, he published
The Radicalism of the American
Revolution, perhaps the most thorough, engaging
inventory of the astonishing democratic social changes
the Revolution unleashed. "[T]he American Revolution,"
he declares, "was not conservative at all; on the
contrary: it was as radical and as revolutionary as any
in history." The Revolution upset social hierarchies and
accelerated the social mobility that has always been one
of the cornerstones of American character. He suggests
that between 1776 and the early 1800s, American culture
and society went from republican to democratic. In
Revolutionary Characters, his latest book, he affirms
that the founders were an extraordinary and admirable
group of political thinkers.
One suspects that Wood's
conclusions changed between 1969, when he published
Creation, and 1991, when he published
Radicalism. In
both books, Wood argues that democratic nationalism
triumphed over republican ideology. In that sense, they
tell the same story—the one by describing an ideological
change, and the other by describing a cultural and
social transformation. Even so, his evaluation of the
shift to democratic nationalism alters from one book to
the other. In the 1960s, Wood, like many others,
believed that individualism had ruined America.
By the 1990s, however, he thought
middle-class democracy was not half bad. So it is not
surprising that academic liberals tend to quote the
former and not the latter book. In the penultimate
chapter of
Creation, "The Relevance and Irrelevance of
John Adams," which Wood reprints in
Revolutionary Characters, he suggests that America rests upon a false
foundation: "for too long and with too much candor
[Adams] had tried to tell his fellow Americans some
truths about themselves that American values and
American ideology would not admit." By the time he wrote
Radicalism, Wood had grown less hostile to the American
regime.
Even if Wood might not like all the
uses to which
Creation is put, that does not mean that
liberals are interpreting it incorrectly. Wood's account
of republicanism is fundamentally
communitarian. Yet by
citing Wood as they do,
Sunstein,
Ackerman, and the
others neglect something essential in his work. In
particular, they ignore the book's conclusion. In
Creation, Wood argues that an anti-capitalist concern
for civic virtue and some idea of the "public good" lay
at the heart of the 1776 revolution. That's what
liberals like about it. Yet to win ratification of the
Constitution, he argues, the Federalists had to pretend
it was rather more democratic than in fact it was, with
results both ironic and tragic.
The Federalists wrote the
Constitution, according to Wood, to insert republican
checks on American democracy, and upon democratic
individualism. But to get the people to ratify the
Constitution, the Federalists had to appeal to the
sovereignty of the people. As a result, they secured the
triumph of the very democracy they were trying to
contain. Necessity and events put republicanism onto the
trash heap of history. In the most frequently cited
passage from
Creation, Wood becomes the heir to, and
modifier of,
Charles Beard and
Louis Hartz:
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[T]he Federalists helped to
foreclose the development of an American intellectual
tradition in which the differing ideas of politics would
be intimately and genuinely related to differing social
interests. In other words, the Federalists in 1787
hastened the destruction of whatever chance there was in
America for the growth of an avowedly aristocratic
conception of politics and thereby contributed to the
creation of that encompassing liberal tradition which
has mitigated and often obscured the real social
antagonisms of American politics. . . . [T]he
Federalists fixed the terms for the future discussion of
American politics . . . and created a distinctly
American political theory but only at the cost of
eventually impoverishing later American political
thought. |
After 1789, Wood argues, there was
no longer any room in America for classical thinking
about the common good, or for the ideas that sustained
it. Wood laments the loss.
Unlike today's liberals who quote
his magnum opus, Wood does not think that America can
return to its republican roots. He may be crying over
spilled milk, but he has the fortitude to admit it. On
that ground, he criticizes some of the uses to which his
work has been conscripted. In a symposium on civic
republicanism in the Chicago Kent Law Review, Wood wrote
that
| the idea that we today can restore
some sort of classical politics to our public life
strikes me as utterly chimerical. . . . All of [the
legal scholars] seem to speak and write as if we had
more freedom and choice in the matter than we do. They
seem to suggest that people can actually be talked into
restoring classical politics or even aspects of
classical politics to American political life. |
According to Wood, any effort to return to past ways of
life is futile. History moves relentlessly onward.
Wood's point is not that America's founding was
republican, but that America was founded as part of a
historical process that soon rendered republicanism
obsolete.
The Virtues of History
If Wood does not quite teach the
lessons that liberals often draw from his works, what
does he teach? He is correct that America's founders
read classical political thinkers with attention and
learned from them, particularly about the connection
between liberty and virtue. It is also true that, when
it was founded, the American regime was something new
and distinctive in history. And it is hardly
unreasonable to find, as he suggests in
Radicalism, that
there was something noble in the founding, and something
good in American society from the start. In that sense,
it is not such a bad thing that Newt Gingrich regularly
quotes him, or that Wood's latest book appeared on
President Bush's summer reading list.
If one reads Wood closely, however,
his work becomes less sound. Consider his treatment of
classical virtue. Wood defines virtue simply as
submission to the public good—that's why it "obliterated
the individual." In other words, he collapses the
classical virtues of individuals—wisdom, courage,
justice, moderation—into a crude notion of civic virtue.
His seemingly exhaustive exegesis of the classical
republican sources of American political thought is
deficient, too. Critics have impeached his use of
sources, noting that he sometimes wrenches quotations
out of context in order to bolster his interpretation.
Wood's discussion of liberty in the
American Revolution is similarly inadequate. In the
hundreds of closely argued pages of
Creation, a book
that is supposed to cover the years 1776 to 1787, the
Declaration of Independence barely receives a glancing
nod, while Locke and social contract theory are shunted
aside perfunctorily. Wood does not think it is important
to explore the ideas of the Declaration in any detail.
In his short book
The American Revolution, the
Declaration fares slightly better. Here he echoes
Lincoln: "The Declaration of Independence set forth a
philosophy of human rights that could be applied . . .
to peoples everywhere. It was essential in giving the
American Revolution a universal appeal."
Wood does not grasp, or does not
think it possible to compare, the difference between the
founders' understanding of rights and that of
contemporary liberalism. Consider this animadversion on
Jefferson from the same volume: "Jefferson stood for the
rights of individuals, and these rights have been
carried to extremes in recent years. So Jefferson and
his Declaration of Independence are at fault." (To be
fair, it is not clear whether he is speaking for himself
here, or describing the views of others with the
historian's pose of critical detachment. This is a
recurring ambiguity in his writing.) Wood's disregard of
the Declaration and Locke's influence is akin to an
account of Christianity that left out St. Paul or
omitted the doctrine of salvation by grace.
By misreading both the classical
understanding of virtue and the modern understanding of
liberty, Wood misconstrues the nature of the American
Revolution and the republic it helped to create. His
readers don't get the tools with which to understand
Jefferson's famous remark that the American mind drew,
inter alia, upon the principles of the elementary books
of public right, such as "Aristotle, Cicero, Locke,
Sidney, etc."
Wood's vices are born of his
virtues. He is a good historian who recognizes that the
past is fundamentally different from the present, and
for that reason, must be understood on its own terms. He
takes that idea to such an extreme, however, that it
damages his achievement. The fundamental difficulty in
Wood's approach to the founding is that he is closed to
the possibility that the founders might have discovered
some political truths that transcend time and place. The
ideas of the founding cannot guide us today, he
suggests, because they are ideas from the past, and the
past, being different from the present, is irredeemably
alien.
This belief animated his
full-throated attack in the New York Review of Books in
1988 on the "quasi-religious view of the Founding" and
the "fundamentalism" of what he called "the Leo Strauss
bicentennial." The Straussians "are wrong to see the
Constitution as having timeless and universal meaning
embodied in the philosophical aims of the Founders and
discoverable through textual exegesis. . . .
[H]istorically there can be no real ‘original intention'
behind the document." This makes one wonder why Wood
ever devoted such extended attention to the
Constitution.
"In the end all the Founders
created something that no one of them ever intended," he
writes. For him, that conclusion is a truism. According
to his premises, historical figures cannot really know
what they are doing; and historians who can know, but
only in retrospect, cannot do anything with their
knowledge. In short, one can learn about the past, but
never from the past. Perhaps that goes too far, but only
a bit. The deepest truth Wood sees in history is that
history never ceases to move. From history, one cannot
learn wisdom but at best a certain Romantic longing to
be part of the communal whole that is in motion. This is
watered-down, very watered-down,
Heidegger.
Another way of saying all this is
that the same dramatic irony—that the readers know
truths about the founding that the founders could not
possibly know—which makes the story Wood tells in
Creation so compelling, also limits Wood's insight into
the era. Thomas Pangle argues that Wood and his
emulators read republican political thought "in a spirit
which is not only alien, but also inferior in
seriousness to the spirit of the eighteenth-century
readers." Historian
Edward Countryman
observes that
"Wood comes very close to writing as if a single
intelligence lay behind the numerous quotations that
make up his book."
John Patrick Diggins is more blunt,
charging that
| Wood has allowed himself to be
convinced that the mind is so much the product of social
interaction that the ideas that derive from its
cognitive operations cannot tell us anything about
historical reality. . . . If one were to follow Wood's
advice to its logical conclusion, intellectual history
would become not the history of ideas but of opinions
and interpretations, and the historian would have no way
of judging the accuracy or rightfulness of such opinions
and interpretations. |
Yet Wood gets angry when his own
premises and interpretations are attacked—as though he
were somehow in the right. He might deny that John Adams
could learn the same things that Cicero or Marsilius did
from reading Aristotle's Politics. Yet Adams thought
that he could. In short, Adams and the other founders
disagreed with Wood's bedrock historical premise. As a
result, his assumptions limit his vision, disabling him
from giving a full account of the American Revolution
and the ideas that animated it; disabling him, indeed,
from giving a consistent defense of his own laudable
researches.
The Future of the Past
These difficulties
make interesting Wood's more recent expressions of
dismay over multiculturalism and postmodernism. His own
commitment to seeing political ideas as transient
products of historical and social context leaves him,
finally, no grounds of resistance to the intellectual
corruption of our time. He arrives unarmed at
conferences and faculty meetings. He betrays this here
and there with a throwaway phrase. In a 1981 review of
Oscar Handlin's
Truth in History, Wood writes: "[A]s we
wait for modernism to engulf us, we can only carry on
our historian's business as best we can, clinging to
Handlin's belief that ‘truth resides in the small pieces
that together form the record.'"
But Wood never
gives the sense that these small pieces will ever fit
together into a larger whole, which could correct or
instruct us about our present circumstances. For him,
political thought remains not even a large jigsaw
puzzle, but an ever-changing kaleidoscope. His criticism
of multiculturalism is thus of a piece with his
dismissal of natural rights. He dislikes the former
because it suggests that a culture cannot, or should
not, cohere as a historical whole. He scorns the latter
because it implies that rights are beyond culture. He
has no truck with either conclusion. For him, cultures
are comprehensive wholes, and they are constantly
evolving.
The most important
reason for Wood's wide, enduring appeal is that he cast
a much-deserved spotlight on the ways in which classical
republican thought infused the founding. Such an inquiry
was a needed corrective to the view of America as a
wholly modern, wholly liberal regime indifferent to
public considerations of virtue. His approach might
yield a new synthesis or at least combination of ancient
and modern strands of political thought. But though his
work raises the question, he does not, and cannot,
answer it. In Wood's recreation of the political thought
of the founding, the idea of natural right (whether
understood in ancient or modern terms) goes missing in
action.
As a historian,
Wood has many virtues. He writes with becoming modesty.
As much as possible, he lets his sources do the talking.
But that is what makes the limits of his vision all the
more frustrating. His "objective" approach to history
simplifies the past in order to make it more susceptible
to interpretation. His historicism leads him to affect
an apolitical posture when writing about deeply
political things. An "objective" historian is not
supposed to make value judgments. That is partly what he
has in mind when he writes that historians cannot pay
attention to philosophers if they are to do their work.
This is a pity, for the political philosophers he
disdains agree with him to a large extent that the
tension between classical republican virtue and modern
liberalism is a crucial question for understanding—and
preserving—America. Yet those scholars of philosophy
speak of moral reason and moral argument, not "value
judgments."
By its ambition and
scope, Wood's body of work will remain preeminent for
some time in the historiography of the American
Founding. But it begs to be superseded by an equally
large-scale treatment that does not shy away from
treating the founders as thinkers and statesmen, rather
than as 18th-century ideologues.
Source:
Claremont
Steven Hayward is a fellow
of the Claremont Institute. He holds a joint appointment
as senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute in
San Francisco, and as F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. He is
the author most recently of
Greatness: Reagan, Churchill, and the Making of
Extraordinary Leaders (Crown Forum).Claremont
Scholar
Gordon S. Wood (born November 27,
1933) is Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of
History Emeritus at
Brown University and the recipient of the 1993
Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the
American Revolution. His book The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776–1787 won a 1970
Bancroft Prize. In 2010, he was awarded the
National Humanities Medal.
Wikipedia
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Revolutionary Characters: What Made the
Founders Different
By
Gordon S. Wood
In this brilliantly
illuminating group portrait of the men who
came to be known as the Founding Fathers,
the incomparable Gordon Wood has written a
book that seriously asks, "What made these
men great?"—and shows us, among many other
things, just how much character did in fact
matter. The life of each—Washington, Adams,
Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton, Madison,
Paine—is presented individually as well as
collectively, but the thread that binds
these portraits together is the idea of
character as a lived reality. They were
members of the first generation in history
that was self-consciously self-made-men who
understood that the arc of lives, as of
nations, is one of moral progress. |
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1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus
Created
By Charles C. Mann
I’m
a big fan of Charles Mann’s previous
book
1491:
New Revelations of the Americas Before
Columbus, in which he
provides a sweeping and provocative
examination of North and South America
prior to the arrival of Christopher
Columbus. It’s exhaustively researched
but so wonderfully written that it’s
anything but exhausting to read. With
his follow-up,
1493, Mann has taken it to a
new, truly global level. Building on the
groundbreaking work of Alfred Crosby
(author of
The Columbian Exchange and, I’m
proud to say, a fellow Nantucketer),
Mann has written nothing less than the
story of our world: how a planet of what
were once several autonomous continents
is quickly becoming a single,
“globalized” entity.
Mann not only talked to countless
scientists and researchers; he visited
the places he writes about, and as a
consequence, the book has a marvelously
wide-ranging yet personal feel as we
follow Mann from one far-flung corner of
the world to the next. And always, the
prose is masterful. In telling the
improbable story of how Spanish and
Chinese cultures collided in the
Philippines in the sixteenth century, he
takes us to the island of Mindoro whose
“southern coast consists of a number of
small bays, one next to another like
tooth marks in an apple.” We learn how
the spread of malaria, the potato,
tobacco, guano, rubber plants, and sugar
cane have disrupted and convulsed the
planet and will continue to do so until
we are finally living on one integrated
or at least close-to-integrated Earth.
Whether or not the human instigators of
all this remarkable change will survive
the process they helped to initiate more
than five hundred years ago remains,
Mann suggests in this monumental and
revelatory book, an open question. |
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The Persistence of the Color Line
Racial Politics and the Obama Presidency
By Randall Kennedy
Among the best things about
The Persistence of the Color Line
is watching Mr. Kennedy hash through the
positions about Mr. Obama staked out by
black commentators on the left and
right, from Stanley Crouch and Cornel
West to Juan Williams and Tavis Smiley.
He can be pointed. Noting the way Mr.
Smiley consistently “voiced skepticism
regarding whether blacks should back
Obama” . . .
The
finest chapter in
The Persistence of the Color Line
is so resonant, and so personal, it
could nearly be the basis for a book of
its own. That chapter is titled
“Reverend Wright and My Father:
Reflections on Blacks and Patriotism.”
Recalling some of the criticisms of
America’s past made by Mr. Obama’s
former pastor, Mr. Kennedy writes with
feeling about his own father, who put
each of his three of his children
through Princeton but who “never forgave
American society for its racist
mistreatment of him and those whom he
most loved.” His father distrusted
the police, who had frequently called
him “boy,” and rejected patriotism. Mr.
Kennedy’s father “relished Muhammad
Ali’s quip that the Vietcong had never
called him ‘nigger.’ ” The author places
his father, and Mr. Wright, in
sympathetic historical light. |
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* * * * *
The White Masters of the
World
From
The World and Africa, 1965
By W. E. B. Du Bois
W. E. B. Du Bois’
Arraignment and Indictment of White Civilization
(Fletcher)
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Ancient African Nations
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If you like this page consider making a donation
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Negro Digest /
Black World
Browse all issues
1950
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
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____ 2005
Enjoy!
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The Death of Emmett Till by Bob Dylan
/
The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll
/
Only a Pawn in Their Game
Rev. Jesse Lee Peterson Thanks America for
Slavery /
George Jackson /
Hurricane Carter
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The Journal of Negro History issues at Project Gutenberg
The
Haitian Declaration of Independence 1804
/
January 1, 1804 -- The Founding of
Haiti
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posted 11 November 2011
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