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Nagin's Reelection as Mayor of New Orleans
Anatomy of a Civil Rights Protest
By Mtangulizi Sanyika,
Thursday, June 1, 2006
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In a remarkable turn in his political
fortune, C. Ray Nagin the troubled and often
controversial Mayor of New Orleans topped the ticket in
the April 22nd primary and went on to win the May 20th
runoff to become Mayor of the city. In both instances,
he won with the overwhelming support of the Black
electorate, many of whom viewed the election as a Civil
Rights protest that transcended particular candidates
and issues.
In the primary, Mr. Nagin garnered
66% of the black vote to lead the field, and in the
runoff, he garnered about 80 % of the black vote and 20
% of the white vote (primarily conservative) to win
re-election.. Four years ago the situation was reversed
in which white voters elected Mr. Nagin with 85% of
their vote, coupled with 35% of the black vote.
The fundamental question now being
asked is which mayor will Nagin be this time around: the
mayor of the black majority that elected him in 2006, or
the mayor of the white minority that elected him in
2002. Astute voters and political analysts now ask what
his re-election portends for the black community given
his past policy support of the uptown and business elite
agenda.
Black voters reelected Nagin to
defeat the overt effort of the white elites to
politically recapture the city given the dispersion of
the majority black population to 47 different states.
The black voters did so without an explicit agreement on
a broad agenda, and without certainty that Mr. Nagin
would support Black oriented or equitable policies to
reconstruct the city.
Symbolism preceded dwarfed and
obscured substance due to a perceived racial threat.
However, now that the voters have decided who they
prefer to be mayor, citizens are now asking and
exploring what they want the mayor to do.
THE PRE- KATRINA POLITICAL MOOD
AND CONTEXT
It is important to understand the
political psychology of black voters before and after
Katrina. During Mr. Nagin’s 3 and ½ years in office
prior to Katrina, there was a widely held perception in
the Black community that white elites were trying to
recapture the city; and that Ray Nagin was their
instrument to accomplish such an objective. After all,
he was elected by the minority white population in a
coalition with higher income black residents.
His policy orientation often appeared
to support white interests, and or higher income
interests rather than Black needs thus furthering the
perception. 62% of black Orleanean households earned
less than 25 [grand] per year, with poverty rates as
high as 35 to 40 % in some neighborhoods.
All social indicators describe a New
Orleans deeply plagued with poor education, high drop
out rates, poverty, low wages and a diminished quality
of life. This black community did not vote for Mr. Nagin
in 2002, and it has never perceived him as its Mayor.
The socio-economic conditions of vast numbers of
African-Americans can only be described as disastrous.
A serious and broad social movement
was fully emerging prior to Katrina that included issues
such as: police brutality/misconduct, the schools, the
residency rule, social and economic inequality,
gentrification and displacement, youth futures, jobs, a
public housing crisis, cultural equity and many other
issues.
The black community of New Orleans
was increasingly divided by race and class and the
further marginalization of the black middle class as
well. Mr. Nagin was regarded by many as the Mayor of the
white minority, rather than the Mayor of the black
majority. Active discussion was taking place among
influential Black leaders and organizations regarding
who would run against him to unseat him.
His on the job experiment as a
businessman with no community, nonprofit or political
training proved to be a disaster for much of black New
Orleans. Rumor has it that many of his former uptown
crowd had deserted him and were searching for an
alternative.
Usher in the Katrina storm and Mr.
Nagin’s mixed performance, and the desire for regime
change began in earnest. However, the politics of
replacement were rendered secondary by multiple
difficulties such as displacement /relocation
challenges, day to day survival problems, election
postponements, legal challenges and threats to totally
disenfranchise Black voters who were dispersed among 47
states in the U.S.
Whatever Nagin’s shortcomings, there
was an emerging sense that that black people were under
attack by those in the white power structure in New
Orleans, Baton Rouge and Washington D.C. The final
indicator of a possible takeover threat was the sheer
number of candidates seeking the Mayor’s office: 23 in
all, including 5 “major” white candidates and only 1
serious Black candidate, the Rev. Tom Watson. This
apparent level of white interest had never been
witnessed since the office was won by Dutch Morial in
1978. Such a lesson in history did not go unnoticed by
Black voters.
These emotions were building for some
time and were heightened by the April march that
crystallized everything as a “Civil rights/Black Power”
challenge that threatened the very survival of New
Orleans as a black city. Of course Nagin’s awkward
chocolate city comment also had its effect: it reminded
Black folks that the city had been Black for a long
time, and now others were trying to turn it vanilla.
The effect was profound . . . Black
folks knew that he was being patronizing, but cheered
because he stated the obvious albeit too little too
late. White folks were angry and uniformly berated
Nagin’s comments as pandering. Many whites had already
deserted him as incompetent and impetuous and the
chocolate city remark gave them a perfect excuse to dump
him publicly, and even call him a racist.
Katrina exposed what everyone already
knew: New Orleans was a social disaster that Katrina
simply exposed for the world to see. It further exposed
what Orleaneans also knew Mr. Nagin was an unpredictable
politician whose policy direction was questionable by
blacks and whose personality was troubling to many
whites.
It was that comment that signaled
Nagin’s acceptance of the loss of his white base, and
his strategic move to capture the black base. He drew
the line in the sand and reminded black folks that they
were the majority and should remain so; thus launching
his re-election as the advocate for black folks: an
emerging Civil Rights and Black Power symbol. It worked.
THE PRIMARY RACE: SORTING THINGS
OUT
For many black citizens, the shape of
the April 22nd primary election had been defined by
three distinct variables: 1) the potential
disenfranchisement of thousands of voters who were
dispersed between 47 states throughout the U.S. 2) the
constant rumors on the number of “significant” white
candidates who may run and the possibility of at least 1
significant black candidate and 3) the crystallization
of black opinion through black forums and a National
civil rights march.
As is turned out, 110,000 ( 38%) of
293,000 registered voters cast ballots for Mayor, 57,000
of whom were African-American ( 53%) with the remaining
53,000 voters being white and other. The black turnout
equaled 31% of the total black registered voters of
188,000; whereas the white turnout was 44% of the total
of 98,000 registered white voters.
The march held on April 1st was a
critical turning point in defining what the election was
all about. As 10,000 marchers proclaimed their support
and solidarity with the voting rights of displaced and
returned New Orleaneans. In classic Civil Rights
fashion, New Orleans became the new Selma (bridge
included); the place to make a stand against systemic
injustice, poverty and racism so evident in the
Superdome fiasco.
The march was supported by all of the
major Civil Rights organizations and their leadership
such as Rev. Jesse Jackson of RAINBOW/PUSH, Marc Morial
of the National Urban League, Bruce Gordon of the NAACP,
Rev. Al Sharpton of NAN, Harry Belafonte, Bill Cosby,
Sybil Taylor of the AFL-CIO, the Millions More Movement
and a host of other national, state and local leaders.
There was a policy component of the
march based on HR 4197 (the CBC’s bill); however policy
was subsumed by the passion of the moment which focused
primarily on the issue of voting rights. Thus, despite
himself, Ray Nagin emerged as the embattled symbol of
the “Battle for New Orleans.”
Unfortunately, he did so without
having to offer a clear, and well developed agenda to
bring black folks home and to rebuild the city in a just
and equitable manner that would include ALL
neighborhoods. For all the good that the national march
did achieve, the lack of a policy emphasis was a missed
opportunity which we in New Orleans must now correct.
The total primary vote included
21,000 early and absentee voters. Mr. Nagin received 38%
or 41,495 votes to finish 1st, followed by Lt. Governor
Mitch Landrieu who captured 29% or 31,490 votes to
finish 2nd. The major white candidates Ron Forman
finished 3rd with 17%, the Republican Rob Couhig
finished 4th with 10%., followed by Virginia Boulet with
2 %.
The progressive Black candidate Rev.
Tom Watson finished a distant 6th with only 1 % of the
vote. Although he was included in the major debates and
was dubbed as being in the “magnificent 7” (5 white plus
Watson and Nagin), the Watson message was constantly
marginalized by the media by referring to him as a “2nd
tier candidate.” Despite this characterization,
according to surveys, Watson won 3 of the 4 debates
sponsored by the National Coalition for Black Civic
Participation (NCBCP). He was the only candidate who
aggressively advocated for the Diaspora and its
unconditional right to return to a high quality,
affordable living environment.
The Nagin primary vote was widely
understood (by black folks) as Civil Rights protest
against a perceived effort to roll back the clock and
deny the vote to black voters and as a threat by the
white power elites to recapture the city. It was not
necessarily understood as a preference for Mr. Nagin and
his policies.
Between the 23 candidates (7 major
and 16 minor) the two top vote getters captured about
90% of the Black vote. In the primary election none of
the 12 black candidates running for office were
defeated: 6 won outright and 6 were forced into the May
20th runoff.
RUNOFF DYNAMICS IN BLACK AND WHITE
The history of Black white mayoral
runoffs in New Orleans suggests that to win, a
candidate’s victory hinges on their ability to capture
at least 80% of the Black vote, and at least 20% of the
white vote. To many citizen and political observers,
this appeared to be a daunting challenge given that Mr.
Landrieu captured 24% of the black vote in the primary,
and that Mr. Nagin captured only about 6% of the white
vote.
In the primary election, Mr. Nagin
and Mr. Landrieu faced each other in a runoff on May
20th which was won by Mr. Nagin with 52% of the vote to
Mr. Landrieu’s 48%. There are multiple explanations for
Mr. Nagin’s victory, each of which served to expand his
base in the black and white community.
After the primary, Mr. Nagin captured
the endorsement of Rob Couhig the white Republican, and
Virginia Boulet the white liberal Democrat. Perhaps in
the biggest coup of the election season, he surprisingly
won the endorsement of Rev. Tom Watson a strident critic
and primary candidate who had referred to Mr. Nagin as a
“double minded liar” during a televised primary debate.
As is the historical tendency, of
politics to make strange bedfellows, Rev. Watson
endorsed Mr. Nagin as a matter of justice and fairness
transcending who the candidate was. That sent a message
to many undecided and vacillating black voters that the
civil rights imperative transcended our particular
preferences in this instance. To his credit, Rev. Watson
also asserted his view that the Agenda must be at the
center of black support for Mr. Nagin, although the
details of such an Agenda had not been thoroughly
formulated.
Translated, that meant that retaining
the office in the hands of the black majority was
consistent with good democracy, and more important than
the policies or personality deficits of Mr. Nagin. The
Watson endorsement confused many of his supporters who
preferred that he remain neutral, rather than endorse
either candidate given his political dislike of both Mr.
Nagin and Mr. Landrieu.
Earlier, Landrieu won the endorsement
of Bishop Paul Morton the prominent leader of the
largest African- American congregation in the city and a
colleague of the Rev. Tom Watson. Both of them had
roundly criticized Mr. Nagin two years earlier for his
insensitivity to Black issues. Bishop Paul Morton was
pointed in his accusation that Mr. Nagin was a “white
man in black skin.” who lamented the absence of a Black
man in the runoff who he could support.
In the week prior to the election,
pollsters and pundits had all but declared Landrieu the
victor, noting that the race was his to lose. The
Times Picayune (the white daily) and the
Louisiana Weekly (the black weekly) both endorsed
Landrieu lending to the perception that he had forged a
formidable biracial coalition that was likely to
prevail. Of course as has been pointed out by this
writer, the polls are not to be believed in the era of
Katrina. Of course Mr. Landrieu’s campaign failed to
offer voters a reason to shift their allegiance to his
candidacy.
Sure enough just as Mr. Nagin
surprised the pollsters and the pundits in the primary,
he also shocked them in the runoff by capturing about
80% of the Black vote, and about 20% of the white vote.
About 113,000 votes were cast in the runoff, which were
about 3,500 votes higher than the primary. Of this total
25,000 were early voting and absentees compared to
21,000 during the primary.
Nagin received 59,460 votes or 52%,
to Landrieu’s 54,131 or 48% of the total. More
importantly, Nagin received about 80 % of all Black
votes cast to Landrieu’s 20%, Thus in both the primary
and the final election, Nagin won because of the
overwhelming support of the Black electorate.
While it is true that 20% of the
black and white electorate were swing voters (they voted
across race lines), it was the Black base that elected
Nagin. Four years ago, the white based gave him 80% of
their votes and thus elected him; whereas in 2006, the
Black base produced the same 80 % result and elected
him.
Make no mistake, without this level
of Black support, even with the 20% white crossover
vote, Nagin would not have won. A 10% shift in the Black
vote would have elected Landrieu. Thus, Nagin owes his
election to Black voters while others had to learn the
complexities of absentee voting for the first time.
BLACK POLITICAL POWER REMAINED INTACT
Thus on Election Day April 22nd, and
again on May 20th we witnessed the first modern
political backlash that was widely felt across the board
in the city. Black voters acted on their racial
interests, despite specific views on a given office, or
candidates or issues. This Katrina election evolved into
a referendum on race, even with evidence of important
crossover voting. It was a rejection of a perceived
takeover or white political coup d’etat.
As stated by a voter to this writer,
“we worked too hard to just let them take it back,” and
by another voter, “this was bigger than Nagin, and he
owes us big time.” Virtually every black officeholder or
candidate faced one or more white challengers or a white
sponsored black challenger for the first time in modern
memory. Black candidates for office won virtually every
position they ran for, with only one loss: Council
District B, which however was off set by the winning of
Council District C in Algiers.
Thus Black candidates retained all 12
of the political offices they previously held or that
they newly sought. This included: 1) the Civil and
Criminal Sheriff’s office 2) the Clerks of Criminal and
Civil District Court 3) 4 City Council seats 4) all 3 of
the Assessor seats previously held and finally the
Mayor’s office. This was an impressive display of Black
political sophistication and maturity given the attack
on Black voting rights ushered in by Katrina’s dispersal
of Black voters and the difficulty black voters
encountered in casting their ballots. Many had to travel
to one of 10 satellite locations or back to New Orleans.
A SECOND NAGIN REGIME: BEYOND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSE
During his first 4 years, Mr. Nagin’s
policy orientation was no doubt tilted towards the
interests of white business and white residents; a
classic “trickle down” approach. The 2006 election
results argue for a decided shift in his policy
orientation towards the interests of Black residents;
otherwise, the city could become ungovernable.
The principal issue is whether or not
the election represents a mandate to govern from the
left, the right or the middle. Alternatively, it could
be characterized as simply a response to perceived
racial threat, without a specific policy orientation
other than “whatever is in the interests of Black
residents.”
Clearly, Black voters concluded that
the white elites should not be allowed to politically
re-capture the city and that although black folks may
differ with Nagin in important ways, returning him to
office served a broader racial interest and the Civil
Rights agenda.
However, it is not to be assumed that
a 2nd Nagin regime will necessarily be sensitive to his
newly found political base. His political instincts will
continue to be responsive to the perspective of the
white elites in the city, rather than his “new” Black
electoral constituency unless black voters force the
shift.
A recent interview with the local
media suggests that the business community and other
white power elites will certainly compete for adoption
of their agenda, and that black voters must organize
themselves to advance their political interests as well.
It is not to be assumed that a Black oriented agenda
will automatically result from the electoral outcome.
The personnel and policy orientation
of a 2nd administration should be of keen interest to
Black and white residents, as well as the involvement of
new advisors and strategists on the team. The old boy
white network should not be accorded majority or
privileged status on boards, commissions and decision
making structures in this term.
Nagin’s “new” black constituency must
be at the center of the discussion of personnel, policy
and resource allocation. There must be an unambiguous
message and appropriate follow up on the pledge to get
our people home with affordable neighborhoods, good
schools, adequate health care, electricity, phones, safe
levees and all other requirements for a decent quality
of life.
Nagin must exert leadership in
helping black Orleaneans to build wealth, and benefit
from the reconstruction and rebuilding of the city as
required by the recently adopted neighborhood Rebuilding
Ordinance. Groups like his rebuilding commission should
be allowed to phase out and be replaced by
demographically representative planning and advisory
entities. Mr. Nagin must consult with the city council
and his black constituency prior to making important
decisions
THE CHALLENGE TO BLACK POLITICS
Some citizens have contended that
regardless of who won, the needs and interests of the
Black community, especially its displaced residents
remains the same, and that an ongoing social movement is
necessary to advance those interests. If Mr. Landrieu
would have won, this imperative would be necessary
because the Black vote would have been a minority of his
base.
Because Nagin won, such a movement is
urgently needed to insure his accountability to an
agenda of interests to the black voters. Black voters
did not give him a mandate to be a dictator or imperial
mayor. Quite the contrary, the Black voter voted against
wholesale white takeover and not for specific Nagin
policies.
Most people who voted for Nagin can
not articulate exactly what his policy positions are
other than that he was black. This writer conducted
Informal surveys and inquiries with a cross section of
voters from different sections of the city which
suggests that race mattered more than policy.
Most voters probably could not
indicate exactly what Mr. Nagin stands for, or exactly
what they expect of him other than to protect black
folk’s interest which is what Black voters expect from
any black Mayor. They all are confronted with a policy
choice that is growth-corporate or one that is
growth-distributive. The voters must move Mr. Nagin from
his first term corporate approach to a second term
distributive approach as New Orleans is re-built.
It is this vague interaction between
race and policy that necessitates a gathering of all
forces to diagnose, analyze, and define the
African-American Agenda during Mr. Nagin’s 2nd regime.
Those who supported Mr. Nagin, those who supported Mr.
Landrieu, and those who did not support either of them
should convene in a “Policy Summit” to produce a
short-medium and long term policy Agenda for the
Reconstruction of the city.
If Mr. Nagin is not held responsible
and accountable, symbolism will triumph over substance
and we will be exploited by self serving politics once
again. The African-American Leadership Project (AALP) is
convening a summit on June 10th at the ASHE Cultural
Arts Center in New Orleans to explore these problems.
We all wish Mr. Nagin well, but
history tells us that we must be vigilant in organizing
for the interests of our people and for all citizens who
need the help of government. After all, the same would
be required if Mr. Landrieu or Rev. Watson if would have
won. Re- building a democratic, just, equitable and
sustainable New Orleans is the challenge for all
progressive politics in the future.
Race may be necessary, but is not
always sufficient to accomplish such a historically
challenging objective. That is the lesson of the Katrina
election.
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Mtangulizi Sanyika is the
Project Manager of the AALP of New Orleans, and served
as a political analyst for the National Coalition for
Black Civic Participation during the recent New Orleans
elections. He is a veteran Civil Rights/Black Power
activist, a planner, policy analyst and organizational
management specialist who has previously taught at
Harvard, MIT, Brown, U. Mass., CAL-Berkeley and Dillard
University. He can be reached at 504- 242- 8353.
Source: THE NEW ORLEANS AGENDA Your
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posted 1 June 2006 |
