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Egypt and the Middle East
It is impossible to consider our negotiations
with Egypt apart from the policy we are adopting in Palestine
and the consensus of opinion current in the Arab Middle East.
The Arab league is much more than a loose confederation of
the Arabs of various countries; it is an active force inspired
by a united aim: to obtain the complete independence of the Arab
peoples. The countries to which its attention is principally
directed at the present moment are Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon,
and Palestine; and the reason for this is that in those
countries full independence is not yet assured. It is in the
light of this fact and of Great Britain's governmental
assurances that she supported these Arab aspirations that the
actions of the League must be considered.
In the debate on Egypt last week our Government's policy as
presented by Mr. Bevin was that friendship with the Arab world
should be the foundation of the revised treaty with Egypt/
"I had the choice," Mr. Bevin said, "of going to
my colleagues and recommending force when the disturbance was
on, but I had equally the chance of offering friendship, which I
thought would re-echo through the Arab world. I chose
friendship." And, earlier in his speech: "I
recommended to my colleagues that they should begin the
negotiations by making a proposal to do what we had promised to
do from the first day we went into Egypt, to evacuate--in other
words, to have the exodus--and to proceed from that basis to
decide what should be substituted for it. If there could be
nothing substituted to protect this great artery it was quite
true the Treaty must stand."
That is clear enough. Putting aside action that might have
been taken in the past, but for which the opportunity has now
gone by--such as the evacuation of all British troops from Cairo
and Alexandria--we must recognize in Mr. Bevin's words the
formulation of a definite policy for which much can be said. if
Great Britain can win the trust and friendship of the Arab
League, there is undoubtedly a better chance of an amicable and
satisfactory settlement of strategic matters.
But here comes the crux of the whole affair. It is no use
offering what we consider to be a sop to Egypt unless our whole
policy with regard to the Arab Middle East is made consistent.
We cannot hope to influence the league--of which Palestine, as
well as Egypt, is a member--and to win its friendship merely by
revising the Egyptian Treaty in a manner consonant with Egypt's
wishes. We must apply the same policy in our relations with all
Arab States--notably with Palestine.
Now the Palestine problem is not only older than the Egyptian
problem, but there are many points with regard to it that make
it a much more serious bone of contention than the latter.
In the first place, Egypt is already an independent State.
The Treaty of 1936 laid that down and there has been no
question, even during the stringencies of the war, of regarding
it as anything else. It is true Cairo was an important base of
operations for our troops in their successful efforts to drive
both the Italian and German forces out of Africa, and even for
overseas operations in Greece and our defence of Syria and Irak;
but this arrangement was agreed to by Egypt and was indeed a
vital necessity for the preservation of her own
independence.
Palestine, on the other hand, has never been free. Moreover,
the McMahon agreement with King Hussein in 1915--whatever
unlikely interpretations may have been placed upon it by
subsequent English politicians--has always been taken by the
Arab world to be the official charter for an independent Arab
government in that country. The Arab grievance therefore
regarding Palestine is far more fundamental and bitter than in
regard to anything we have done of failed to do in Egypt.
But even if England's untenable interpretation of the McMahon
letters be accepted, a final and authoritative declaration of
policy was laid down in 1939. This was contained in a White
paper, by which it was determined that 10,000 Jews were to be
admitted into Palestine each year for five years, with the
addition of 25,000 as soon as the High Commissioner was
satisfied that they could be absorbed, and that thereafter no
further Jewish immigration would be permitted unless the Arabs
of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce in it. This immigration
of 75,00 Jews has taken place.
Now, according, to our official promise in the White paper,
all Jewish immigration should cease and, in accordance with
rules laid down for Mandates of this class, an independent
Government should be set up as soon as possible. Great Britain
is therefore bound--even apart from her pledge in the McMahon
letters--to hasten the inauguration of an independent Arab State
in Palestine. But all this has been upset by the recommendations
of the recent Anglo-American Commission. If Mr. Bevin adopts the
policy recommended by the Commission, so far from coming forward
as a friend to the Arab world, he will be acting in a way
calculated to arouse in it the most violent antagonism.. His sop
to Egypt will count for nothing.
There is another difference between the cases of Egypt and of
Palestine. The Suez Canal, designed and constructed by the
French, has always been regarded as a passage-way of
international, and more especially of British concern. It is the
link between Great Britain on the one hand and Australia, New
Zealand, and British possessions in the Far East on the other.
Our Government has therefore a perfect right to insist that they
should be able to defend it in the event of war. No such point
of Imperial importance exists in Palestine. The Arab League
would therefore be much more likely to appreciate our insistence
upon maintaining control of the Canal than they ever will upon
our standing in the way of Palestine independence.
It has been explained by our Government that the thing that
rankles in the hearts of Egyptians is the presence of British
troops in their country. there is no reason to doubt the truth
of this, though a defensive area manned by R.A.F. and A.A. units
on the unpopulated eastern side of the canal would not seem to
be an extravagance concession to request in the circumstances.
But exactly the same thing rankles in the hearts of the Arabs of
Palestine. One of the three demands made last week by the Arab
Higher Committee was that all British troops should leave
Palestine. Our Government has made no mention of this. Yet the
whole Arab attitude would undoubtedly be altered and a general
agreement entered into with the league.
As things stand at present we are giving away indispensable
control over vital communications to an Arab world that remains
hostile to us. * * *
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updated 11 June 2008 |
